

Dialog SDK 5.0.3 Training Materials – Pairing, Bonding and Security

2016 June

...personal ...portable ...connected

BLE Custom profile with security



BLE security overview

Custom profile service Source code discussion

What would you see as output



BLE Custom profile with security

Let's build a demo together ...



- Before we start, we recommend you to …
 - Take a look at Training material 2 custom profile application
- What are you going to learn from this training ...
 - Basic understanding of BLE Security and issues
 - What is Pairing? What is Bonding?
 - 'Just-Works' pairing
 - Single-device bonding
 - Basic understanding of multi-device bonding
 - Small assignment to add pairing in the custom service database
- What's next ...
 - See Reference section of this training slide



GAP LE Security

Generic Access Profile Low Energy (LE) Security Considerations

Several security concerns exist with Bluetooth LE communications:

• Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)

A MITM requires an attacker to have the ability to both monitor and alter messages into a communication channel. One example is active eavesdropping, in which the attacker makes independent connections with the victims and relays messages between them to make them believe they are talking directly to each other over a private connection. The attacker must be able to intercept all relevant messages passing between the two victims and inject new ones. Protection against MITM attack is obtained by using the passkey entry pairing method or may be obtained using the out of band pairing method.



GAP LE Security

Generic Access Profile Low Energy (LE) Security Considerations

Several security concerns exist with Bluetooth LE communications:

Passive Eavesdropping

Passive Eavesdropping is secretly capturing pairing data, or normal communications if no pairing has been done, and then listening (by using a sniffing device) to the private communication of others without consent. BLE v4.0 offers no protection against such attacks. (In BLE v4.2, LE Secure Connection uses ECDH public key cryptography as a means to thwart passive eavesdropping attacks – not considered further here.)

Privacy/Identity Tracking

BLE supports the Privacy Feature that reduces the ability to track a LE device over a period of time by changing the Bluetooth device address on a frequent basis. The frequently changing address is called the private address and the trusted devices can resolve it.



GAP LE Security

Generic Access Profile Low Energy (LE) Bonding

- To remove the risk of MITM and passive eavesdropping attacks, two BLE devices may be paired.
- Pairing is the process in which two devices exchange security and identity information, to create a trusted relationship.
- This security and identity information is also known as the bonding information. When the devices store the bonding information, 'a bond is created' or 'the devices have bonded.'
- Once keys are exchanged, each end of the connection may store the keys. This 'bonds' the devices, and allows them to communicate securely, or to re-pair in future, without reexchanging keys.
- BLE devices can be configured in non-bondable mode or bondable mode.
 Pairing is only possible in bondable mode .
- Bonding can only be initiated by the master device.



Authentication Options

- The devices first exchange IO capabilities in the Pairing Feature Exchange to determine which of the following methods are available to pair:
 - 'Just Works Pairing.' Both devices set the Temporary Key value to zero
 - Passkey Entry. Uses 6 numeric characters
 - Out Of Band (OOB). Offers greater security than using the Passkey Entry or Just Works methods. However, both devices need to have matching OOB interfaces (e.g. near-field or infra-red communications, etc.)
- The information exchanged is used to select which key generation method is used.
- Note that any Master can authenticate with a BLE device and exchange bonding information. To limit access, some further authorization must be performed (although this can be done after authentication).
- The recommended pairing scheme depends on the IO capabilities of the device; this is described in Section 2.3.5.1 of Volume 3 Part H of the Bluetooth Specification



Authentication of Characteristics

- Authentication in the GATT Profile is applied to each characteristic independently
- To enable authentication and subsequent encryption of a characteristic, the following steps must occur:
 - 1. The GATT Profile procedures that are used to access information can be configured to require the client to be authenticated and have an encrypted connection before a characteristic can be read or written.
 - 2. In this case, and where the physical link is unauthenticated or unencrypted, the server shall send an Error Response with the status code set to Insufficient Authentication.
 - 3. The client wanting to read or write this characteristic can then request that the physical link be authenticated using the GAP authentication procedure, and once this has been completed, send the request again.



Single Device Bonding

- By default, the latest key is always stored in retention RAM.
 - This is retained in all sleep modes and will remain unless the device is completely powered down.
 - If using a single master, no extra bonding needs to be performed.
 - Connecting with a different master will erase the existing bonding information.
- The "just works" version of the pairing mechanism is insecure if the air traffic is sniffed by someone during pairing since the long term key is sent in plain text over the air (but only during the pairing phase), so avoid this mode if possible.
- Passkey entry (MITM) example is shown in the next slides. The example shows how to enable security at connection.

The example for simple bonding is based on the custom profile example from Training Material 2.



Exercise: how to enable MITM passkey entry



In da1458x_config_basic.h, enable CFG_APP_SECURITY

#define CFG_APP_SECURITY

In user_config.h, change line 44 to 58. (tk.key = PIN code in hex: 0x01E240 = "123456"). We are using a fixed PIN code in this example, but normally the PIN is randomly generated.

```
static const struct security configuration user security configuration = {
        .oob
                   = GAP OOB AUTH DATA NOT PRESENT,
        .key size
                   = KEY LEN,
                  = GAP IO CAP DISPLAY ONLY,
        .iocap
                  = GAP AUTH REQ MITM BOND,
        .auth
                  = GAP SEC1 AUTH PAIR ENC,
        .sec req
        .ikey dist
                  = GAP KDIST SIGNKEY,
        .rkey dist
                  = GAP KDIST ENCKEY,
        .tk={
                },
        .csrk={
                },
};
```

BLE Custom Profile - Bonding Exercise: how to enable MITM passkey entry

 In app_default_handlers.c disable the first two lines in function default_app_on_tk_exch_nomitm()

In user_config.h (almost at the end of the file) change this line

(0)

```
.security_request_scenario=DEF_SEC_REQ_NEVER
```

into

```
.security_request_scenario=DEF_SEC_REQ_ON_CONNECT
```

• In user_modules_config.h change this define into (0)

```
#define EXCLUDE_DLG_SEC
```



Exercise: how to enable MITM passkey entry

.app on adv undirect complete

.app on adv direct complete

.app on scanning completed

.app on db init complete

.app on adv report ind

.app on pairing request

.app on tk exch nomitm

.app on pairing succeded

.app on mitm passcode req

.app on encrypt req ind

.app on irk exch

.app on csrk exch

.app on encrypt ind

.app on ltk exch

 In user_callback_config.h check that the default handlers are set, the default project should be correct.

static const struct app_callbacks user_app_callbacks = {

- .app_on_connection = default_app_on_connection, .app on disconnect = default app on disconnect,
- .app_on_disconnect .app on update params rejected
 - = NULL,

.app_on_update_params_complete = NULL,

- .app_on_set_dev_config_complete = default_app_on_set_dev_config_complete,
 - = app_advertise_complete,
 - = NULL,
 - = default_app_on_db_init_complete,
 - = NULL,
 - = NULL,
 - = default_app_on_pairing_request,
 - = default_app_on_tk_exch_nomitm,
 - = NULL,
 - = default_app_on_csrk_exch,
 - = default_app_on_ltk_exch,
 - = NULL,
 - = NULL,
 - = NULL,
 - = default_app_on_encrypt_req_ind,

};

GATT Characteristic Value permissions



- The following example shows how to enable security per characteristic
- This can be achieved by changing the permissions from UNAUTH to AUTH
- Using this setting .security_request_scenario=DEF_SEC_REQ_ON_CONNECT in user_config.h you can select when authorization is required: during connection or during read/write of a characteristic.

Single Device Bonding Example

 To convert an existing read or write characteristic to require pairing change the Characteristic Value permissions in the Database Description change the permission flag:

```
/// Full CUSTOM Database Description - Used to add attributes into the database
static const struct attm desc 128 custs1_att_db[CUST_IDX_NB] =
    // CUSTOM Service Declaration
    [CUST IDX SVC] = { (uint8 t*) & att decl svc,
                                  ATT UUID 16 LEN,
                                  PERM(RD, ENABLE),
                                  sizeof(custom svc),
                                  sizeof(custom svc),
                                  (uint8 t*)&custom svc},
    // Custom Write Characteristic Declaration
    [CUST IDX WRITE CHAR] = { (uint8 t*) &att decl char, ATT UUID 16 LEN,
                                  PERM(RD, ENABLE),
                                  sizeof(custom write char),
                                  sizeof(custom write char),
                                  (uint8 t*)&custom write char},
    // Custom Write Characteristic Value
                                  = {CUST WRITE CHAR UUID 128,
    [CUST IDX WRITE CHAR VAL]
                                         ATT UUID 128 LEN,
                                         PERM(WR, UNAUTH),
                                         DEF CUST CHAR LEN,
                                         Ο,
                                         NULL},
```

};

• This is the only change required to support bonding with a single Master.

What would you see as output

iPad ᅙ	14	:18		≵ 74% 💶 🗗
K Back	Perip	heral		Clone
DIALOG-PRFL				
UUID: B8A66E34-E74F-D0F0-115A-36	5052EADB12			
Connected				
ADVERTISEMENT DATA				Show
Device Information	Bluetooth Pairing Request			
Manufacturer Name String Dialog Semi	"DIALOG-PRFL" would like to pair with your iPad. Enter the code shown on "DIALOG-PRFL".			
Model Number String DA1458x				
Firmware Revision String v_5.0.3.0	Cancel	Pair		>
Software Revision String				
System ID <123456ff fe9abcde>				
PnP ID <01d20080 050001>				
UUID: EDFEC62E-9910-0BAC-5241-D8BDA6932A2F				
Control Point				
5 Č Ô				
1 2 3 4	5 6	37	8 9	0 🗵
	: ()		 &	return
#+= undo . , ? ! ' " #+=				
ABC				АВС



- Note: The devices will be connectable in this and future examples. Connecting to a
 device will mean that other scanners won't be able to locate the device it is
 recommended that you only connect to your own device.
- Note: Some scanners (notably Apple devices) may not update the name of device if it is changed – to correct this, it is necessary to disable then re-enable Bluetooth.

Multiple Device Bonding

- To support multiple devices, the bonding information must be stored for each device.
- The simplest way is to store the bonding information in retained memory, using the attribute _____((section("retention_mem_area0"), zero__init)).
- The SDK **app_sec** module provides a structure <code>app_sec_env</code> in this retained memory in which bonding information may be stored.
 - This module also provides helper functions to generate PINs and the Long Term Key



Multiple Device Bonding

- Bonding information may be stored and used using the following procedure:
 - On successful pairing, the callback .app_on_pairing_succeded will be called. At this point you may store the app_sec_env.rand_nb, app_sec_env.ediv, app_sec_env.ltk and app_sec_env.key_size values to your permanent store.
 - When the callback .app_on_encrypt_req_ind is called, do a lookup on the app_sec_env.rand_nb and app_sec_env.ediv variables stored previously. If a match is found, write the values to app_sec_env.rand_nb, app_sec_env.ediv, app_sec_env.ltk and app_sec_env.key_size and return true.
- Dialog's IoT Sensor and Keyboard reference designs (available through support.dialog-semiconductor.com) include example code dealing with storing bonding information to EEPROM.



Further Considerations

- Other pairing modes:
 - Other pairing methods like Pass Key Entry and Out Of Band are supported by the Dialog platform and SDK
- Private addresses:
 - Generally, a peripheral will broadcast its presence to all listeners using the same address every time. It is possible to obfuscate the identity of a peripheral using a 'Private Address'
 - Only devices which are bonded to the client can resolve the address, using their stored keys.
- Bondable / non-bondable:
 - When a master connects to a BLE slave, it may only pair if the slave allows it.
 - Typically, bonding can be controlled using a user interaction on the device for example, pressing a specific button will start the device advertising in a mode that allows bonding.



Information on bonding storage feature

Further Considerations



- The DA14580 does not store any bonding info after power cycling the device. Even if the PIN code is not changed, the LTK is changed every time.
 - It is recommended to remove the bonding info in the Smartphone/Tablet.
 - It is normal because when you reset the DA14580, the keys do not match anymore.
 - There is a random part in the key so the bonding information is not stored in the memory of DA14580.



Reference



- https://developer.bluetooth.org/gatt/Pages/default.aspx
- https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications/adopted-specifications
- http://support.dialog-semiconductor.com/connectivity
- https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Universally_unique_identifier
- Register with Dialog semiconductor to get enormous development support
 - http://support.dialog-semiconductor.com/user/register

The Power To Be...



